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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction over this appeal is originally with the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), but this case has been transferred by order of the Utah Supreme 
Court to the Utah Court of Appeals under §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) these appellees hereby indicate that the Statement of 
Issues by the appellant is essentially correct but the three issues stated by appellant are 
really one issue. That issue is whether Plaintiff timely filed suit based upon the notice 
and filing requirements of Title 63 Chapter 30 of the Utah Code. 
The standard of review stated by Plaintiff that a correction of error standard 
applies is correct. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellee's claim that §63-30-11, §63-30-13 through §63-30-15 and §63-37-1 of 
the Utah Code control the resolution of this appeal. Those statutes are reproduced in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff had several guns seized from him during the course of a drug arrest in 
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Utah County. Those guns were later ordered to be returned by the Fourth District Court, 
but were not. Plaintiff brought actions for negligence, replevin, conversion, and 
"bailment55 against those governmental entities he believed to be responsible for the loss 
of his property. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint with the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County 
on September 5, 1997. R., p.8. All of the Defendants answered and brief discovery was 
conducted. Pleasant Grove City then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 13, 
1998, for itself and its police department. R., p.90. 
Lehi City and the Lehi Police Department followed with its own Motion for 
Summary Judgment on October 5, 1998. R., p. 185. Utah County, the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
October 5, 1998. R., p.263. Provo City and its police department joined the motions for 
summary judgment orally at the hearing on the motions. R., p. 340. 
With all of the Defendants having filed dispositive motions, a hearing was held on 
all of those motions on February 2, 1999, before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, 
Fourth District Court. R., p.323. The court granted the pending motions and entered a 
formal order on February 17, 1999. R., p.340. See, Addendum "A5'. On the same day, 
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February 17, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial. R., p.326. That motion was 
considered and denied in a ruling dated March 17, 1999. See, Addendum "B". R., p.368. 
The formal Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered by the court on April 21, 
1999. R.,p.371. See, Addendum "C'\ 
On May 24, 1999, Plaintiff faxed to the court a Motion for Extension of Time for 
Filing Notice of Appeal with the hard-copy filed with the court on May 25, 1999. The 
order granting an extension was signed May 26, 1999. R., p.381. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on June 21, 1999. R., p.399. 
Note that the Notice of Appeal calls this appeal a "cross-appear9. In fact, there is 
no cross-appeal and this is misnomer. 
Pleasant Grove City has earlier filed a Motion to Dismiss this appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court, but the appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals before the 
Utah Supreme Court considered that motion. The Utah Court of Appeals deferred ruling 
on the Motion to Dismiss in an order entered November 24, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No depositions were taken in this action but there was limited written discovery. 
The facts leading to this action are derived primarily from the Complaint and that 
evidence which was used to support and oppose the pending motions for summary 
judgment. 
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As of August 5, 1994, Plaintiff Ken Harward was a resident of Utah County, R., 
pp.5, 199. On August 5, 1994, members of the Utah County Narcotics Enforcement 
Team, consisting of officers from Lehi City Police Department, Provo City Police 
Department, Pleasant Grove City Police Department, and the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office arrested Mr. Harward and seized guns from him. R., pp.7, 199. In a subsequent 
forfeiture action, the Fourth District Court ordered that the firearms in question be 
returned to Mr. Harward. R., p. 100. Those firearms were not returned. R., p.6. 
Pursuant to §63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Plaintiff prepared 
multiple Notices of Claim addressed to each Defendant and those notices are dated June 
6, 1996. R., p. 141 (Utah County), p.132 (Lehi City), p.126 (Provo City), and p. 147 
(Pleasant Grove City). Plaintiff claims the Notices of Claim were delivered to each 
Defendant via the U.S. Postal Service Express Mail. As evidence of that delivery, 
Plaintiff produced Customer Copy Receipts of U.S. Postal Express Mail wrappers which 
are addressed to each Defendant and show a posting date of June 6, 1996. R., pp. 145, 
139, 127, 121. Defendants deny receiving Notices of Claim.1 No letters of denial of 
Plaintiffs claims were sent by Defendants and Plaintiff, thereafter, filed his Complaint on 
1
 Specifically, the Pleasant Grove City Recorder attests that she never received either 
Notice of Claim addressed to the Pleasant Grove Defendants. R., p. 104. 
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September5, 1997. R.,p.8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant governmental entities show in this brief that Plaintiff failed to file 
his lawsuit against them within one year after expiration of the time to deny the claim as 
required by §63-30-15 of the Utah Code. 
Section 63-37-1 of the Utah Code provides that a claim is filed when it is 
deposited in the United States Mail. By failing to include this particular statute in his 
calculations of the time to file his lawsuit, Plaintiff erred and missed the filing deadline. 
This brief additionally shows Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the consequences of his 
untimely failing by asking the Court to take judicial notice of when mail is delivered is 
not allowed by the Utah Rules of Evidence in the circumstances. 
Finally, Defendants show that they have always plead the defense that the Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act so that arguments made in 
his brief to the effect that the affirmative defense had been waived are incorrect. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Suit Against Defendants Is Barred as Untimely Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act 
Plaintiffs suit against Defendants for recovery of personal property seized during a 
drug arrest is governed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Governmental 
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Immunity Act" or "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1997). The Governmental 
Immunity Act recognizes the doctrine of sovereign immunity as essential to the protection 
of governmental entities "in rendering the many and ever increasing number of 
governmental services." Taylor v. Ogden City School District 927 P.2d 159,162 (Utah 
1996). The Act establishes, however, waivers to the immunity doctrine by creating 
certain statutory causes of action against governmental entities. See e ^ Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10 (1997) ("Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent acts"). The Act 
also establishes notice and filing requirements for a claimant to perform before the 
statutory causes of action are perfected. Courts have consistently held that "where a 
cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is a 
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit." Scarborough v. Granite School 
District 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975). Plaintiff has failed to fully comply with the 
Immunity Act's condition precedent notice and filing requirements to maintain his suit. 
As such, Plaintiffs suit is barred. 
The notice and filing provisions of the Immunity Act require that before a Plaintiff 
may initiate suit against a political subdivision, a notice of claim must be directed and 
delivered to the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after the 
claim arises. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) and 63-30-13 (1997). Thereafter, the 
political subdivision has ninety days to accept or deny the claim, or have the claim 
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deemed denied if silent after the expiration of the ninety day period. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-14 (1997). If a Plaintiffs claim is denied or deemed denied with expiration of the 
ninety day period, Plaintiff has one year thereafter to file suit. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
15(2) (1997) ("The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired.. 
In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all Defendants 
holding that Plaintiff failed to timely file his complaint within the one year following the 
expiration of the ninety day period. That holding was based upon a finding that the 
ninety-day notice period began on June 6, 1996, the date upon which Plaintiff placed his 
notices of claim within the United States Mail and are deemed delivered on that date 
pursuant to § 63-37-1 of the Utah Code. The trial court succinctly explained its holding 
in its Ruling denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial: 
The Court finds that the date of filing Plaintiffs Notices of 
claim is June 6, 1996, per § 63-37-1. Plaintiff had one year 
from the claim denial date to file suit. September 4, 1996, is 
deemed the claim denial date, because it is 90 days after the 
date of filing the Notices of Claim. Therefore, the last date 
for Plaintiff to timely file was September 3, 1997. The 
Plaintiffs suit against Defendants, filed on September 5, 
1997, is time barred as failing to comply with § 63-30-15 of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Ruling, dated March 17, 1999, R., p. 368. The trial courfs ruling is correct as a matter of 
law and should be affirmed. 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiffs Notices Were Deemed 
Delivered On June 6,1996 Pursuant to §63-37-1 of the Utah Code, 
To prove delivery of his Notices of Claim to Defendants, Plaintiff produced the 
Notices of Claim addressed to each Defendant and Customer Copy Receipts of U.S. 
Postal Service Express Mail addressed to each Defendant (collectively referred to as 
"Customer Copy Receipts"). R.,pp. 121, 127, 139, 145. See, Addendum "G". Plaintiff 
uses the Customer Copy Receipts to show he sent notices to the Defendants through the 
United States Mails on June 6, 1996. Note that none of these receipts actually show 
delivery of the notices, only that this form was completed at the time of mailing. 
For delivery of notices of claim, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act neither 
specifies the manner in which notices are to be delivered (e.g. via service by constable, 
hand-delivery, mail, facsimile etc.), nor the computation of time for the type of delivery 
performed. However, while the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not provide the 
foregoing guidance or requirements, Chapter 37 of Title 632 of the Utah Code does so for 
notices of claims which are transmitted through the United States Mail. § 63-37-1 of the 
Utah Code provides: 
2
 The Utah Code entitles Title 63 as "State Affairs in General". See Utah Code Ann. Vol. 6D p. 1 (1997). 
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MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, 
RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS TO 
STATE OR POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS 
63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date — When 
mailing date deemed filing date. 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or 
any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the 
state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be 
deemed filed or made and received by the state or political 
subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office cancellation 
mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper 
containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political 
subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is 
illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or made 
and received on the date it was mailed if the sender 
establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deposited 
in the United States mail on or before the date for filing or 
paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any such report, 
tax return, statement, or other document required by law to be 
filed, the sender files with the state or political subdivision a 
duplicate within thirty days after written notification is given 
to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its 
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other 
document. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 (1997) (emphasis added).3 Utah courts have looked to §63-
37-1 of the Utah Code when determining whether a Plaintiff complied with the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Lister v. Utah Valley 
Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (discussed infra). 
Pursuant to § 63-37-1(1), when a Plaintiff has a claim against the state or political 
subdivision and he/she transmits their notice of claim through the United States Mail, that 
notice is deemed filed and received by the governmental entity on the date shown by the 
post-office cancellation mark or other appropriate wrapping. Plaintiff allegedly delivered 
his notices of claim to Defendants via U.S. Express Mail and the wrapper receipts 
Plaintiff produced were the Customer Copy Receipts showing the date of mailing as June 
6, 1996. Therefore, §63-37-1 applies and the date upon which Plaintiffs notices are 
deemed filed is June 6, 1996. 
Computing the delivery date of the Notices of Claim as June 6, 1996, the ninety 
(90) day notice period expired on September 4, 1996 and the filing period for Plaintiffs 
action expired on September 4, 1997. Plaintiffs Complaint, being filed September 5, 
1997, is barred as untimely under §63-30-13 through 15 of the Governmental Immunity 
3
 § 63-37-2 of the Utah Code addresses the time computation for claims filed and delivered via registered or 
certified mail and "the date of registration or certification shall be deemed the postmark date." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-37-2 (1997). 
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Act. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting Defendants summary judgment and 
dismissing Plaintiffs suit with prejudice. 
Computation made in the preceding paragraph shows that Harward filed his action 
one day late. This computation is made by following the usual rule that the one year 
allowed in §63-30-13 to file a lawsuit after denial of the claim begins the day after the 
last day the governmental entity had to deny the claim. Pleasant Grove City argued to the 
trial court that the Harward lawsuit was actually filed two days late. R., p. 172. Pleasant 
Grove argued that the language of 63-30-13 is that the lawsuit must be filed "within" one 
year after denial of the claim. Looking at a calendar, 365 days after September 4, 1996, 
is September 3, 1997. A diagram of this calculation taken from R., p. 165 is reproduced 
in the addendum. Certainly, whether one adopts the Pleasant Grove City method of 
calculation or that suggested by the other Defendants in this brief, Plaintiffs Complaint 
was filed at least one day late and is thereby barred. 
C. Plaintiff Fails To Show Why § 63-37-1 Does Not Apply To This 
Case. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in applying § 63-
37-1 to the delivery of his notices of claim and computing the time he had to file suit 
based upon that statute. He makes both legal and factual arguments as to why § 63-37-1 
does not apply in this case, but, as shown below, each argument fails. 
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First, Plaintiff argues that § 63-37-1 does not apply to compute the delivery date of 
his notices of claim because § 63-30-11 controls the question of delivery. To support his 
argument, Plaintiff asserts the statutory construction principle that when two statutes 
address the same subject the specific statute controls over the general statute. 
While Plaintiffs recitation of the statutory construction principle regarding 
specific versus general statutes is correct, it is misapplied in this case because §63-30-11 
and 63-37-1 do not address the same subject, but rather address corresponding subject 
matter. § 63-30-11 sets out the required content to be contained in a notice of claim and 
requires that the notice be directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
for the state or political subdivision. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. § 63-30-11 does not, 
however, mandate a particular manner of delivery for the notices, (e.g. personal service), 
nor does the provision establish the way to compute time for the type of delivery 
performed. § 63-37-1 addresses the subjects of manner and computation time with 
respect to mail delivery and deems the time of delivery to be the date as "shown by the 
post office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper 
containing it." Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1) (1997). Therefore, both Sections 63-30-11 
and 63-37-1 address conforming subject areas and in this case both apply since Plaintiff 
delivered his notices of claim through the United States Mail. 
-12-
Second, Plaintiff argues that the requirements of §63-37-1 are not met in this case 
in the same manner they were not met in the case of Lister v. Utah Valley Community 
College. 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). While the Lister case demonstrates that § 
63-37-1 applies to notices of claim under the Governmental Immunity Act, its holding is 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. 
In Lister, the plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against the Utah Valley 
Community College ("UVCC"). As a defense and the subject of a summary judgment 
motion, UVCC asserted that the plaintiff failed to deliver his notice of claim to the Utah 
State Attorney General as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 12 of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. The plaintiff alleged that he had mailed the notice of claim to the 
Attorney General, but he did not have proof of mailing by a post-office cancellation mark 
or mark on another appropriate wrapper as required by § 63-37-1(1). However, the 
plaintiff attempted to proved that the notice was mailed to the Attorney General pursuant 
to § 63-37-1(2) by way of presenting affidavit testimony regarding plaintiffs counsel's 
office mailing custom. The trial court granted UVCCs summary judgment motion 
finding that the plaintiffs evidence of office mailing custom was insufficient to prove 
mailing and delivery to the Attorney General. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment finding that the plaintiff 
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failed to show that a notice of claim specifically addressed to the Attorney General's 
Office had ever been prepared. Listen 881 P.2d at 941. In making that finding, the Lister 
Court established criteria for proving mailing through office mailing custom and that 
criteria is: 1) showing that the document that was allegedly mailed was actually prepared, 
and 2) showing that the document in question was mailed. Id. at 940. The plaintiff in 
Lister failed to prove either criteria to meet the burden of proving mailing under §63-37-
1(2). 
The issue on appeal in this case is not whether delivery took place, but rather, 
assuming delivery took place by mail, what date is deemed the delivery date for 
Plaintiffs Notices of Claim. Plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Listen claims to have proved 
delivery by producing the Customer Copy Receipts, dated June 6, 1996. Assuming the 
Receipts to be valid and authentic, they show that the notices of claim were transmitted 
by mail and the date shown on the Receipts of June 6, 1996 is deemed the date of 
delivery. Accordingly, § 63-37-1(1) is triggered and neither plaintiff nor Defendant have 
to prove evidence of delivery pursuant to § 63-37-1(2). as the plaintiff attempted to do in 
Lister. Computing the delivery date as of June 6, 1996 demonstrates that Plaintiffs suit 
filed September 5, 1997 was untimely, being one year and ninety-one days after delivery 
of the notices. Thus, the ruling in Lister regarding proof of delivery does not prove that 
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§63-37-1(1) does not apply to this case and date of delivery should not be June 6, 1996. 
Third, Plaintiff claims that in order to trigger the application and effect of §63-37-1, 
the notice of claim must be mailed to the state or political subdivision by registered or 
certified mail as required by § 63-37-2. A plain reading of Sections 63-37-2 and 63-37-1 
show that they apply to two different types of mailings and both do not require registered 
or certified mailing. § 63-37-2 addresses and applies to documents specifically 
transmitted via registered or certified mail. Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-2 (1997) ("sent by 
United States mail and either registered or certified"). § 63-37-1 applies to documents 
generally "transmitted through the United States mail." Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1 
(1997). Therefore, registered or certified mail is not required and Plaintiff is again wrong 
in claiming that §63-37-1 does not apply to this case. 
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that he never intended to have delivery of his notice of 
claim computed pursuant to § 63-37-1, for June 6, 1996. Rather he intended the delivery 
time to be computed from June 7, 1996 based upon overnight delivery service. To 
support his assertion, Plaintiff claims that the Court should take judicial notice that the 
postmaster guarantees overnight delivery. 
Judicial Notice is governed by Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and as an 
evidentiary rule it must be asserted at the trial level and cannot be raised for the first time 
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on appeal. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 455-56 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988) (court of appeals would not take 
judicial notice of record in prior proceeding as the assertion of judicial notice was raised 
for the first time on appeal). Plaintiff did not assert judicial notice of his manner of 
delivery at the trial level and therefore this Court cannot take judicial notice of the 
delivery now. 
Even assuming the Court could utilize judicial notice at this stage in the case, 
overnight delivery by the postmaster is not a fact which the Court can take judicial notice 
of because delivery is not the type of fact "capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Rule 201(b)(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. That finding is especially true in this case because Defendants 
contest that they ever received the notices of claim Plaintiff allegedly delivered, and 
Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendants, as addressees of the Express Mail, signed for 
and received delivery of the notices. The Customer Copy Receipts show that Plaintiffs 
counsel did not check the box entitled "WAIVER OF SIGNATURE" in which he could 
have chosen not to require the addressee to sign for the delivery. R., p. 121, 127, 139, 
145. See, Addendum "G". Since that box was not checked on the Receipts it appears 
that the Postal Service requires a signature of the addressee upon delivery and Plaintiff 
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failed to produce that evidence. Accordingly, the Court cannot take judicial notice of 
guaranteed overnight delivery and that the date of delivery should be June 7,1996. 
Moreover, where strict compliance with notice and filing requirements is 
mandated by the Governmental Immunity Act, Plaintiffs subjective intent to have the 
delivery of the notices take place on June 7, 1996 is irrelevant. What is relevant is 
objective conduct and in this case Plaintiffs conduct shows that delivery took place via 
the United States Mail and that method of delivery is governed by statute and the date of 
delivery is deemed to be the date shown on the customer copy receipt. Therefore, § 63-
37-1 applies to this case and Plaintiffs notices of claim must be computed as delivered on 
June 6, 1996. 
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to raise § 63-37-1 as an affirmative 
defense within their Answers and such failure "may" constitute a waiver of said claim 
pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argument is both 
legally and factually incorrect, and his use of the word "may" shows Plaintiffs own 
misgivings regarding the argument. 
Defendants are not obliged to assert § 63-37-1 as an affirmative defense under 
Rule 12 or any other rule regarding conditions of suit, since it addresses a method of 
delivery and computation of that delivery, and does not address conditions or limitations 
-17-
to filing suit. See Shunk v. Jordan School District 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996) (State was 
not specifically obliged to deny or affirm the plaintiffs compliance with the notice and 
filing requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act when plaintiff failed to 
specifically plead compliance within his complaint). Moreover, Defendants complied 
with the requirement of Rule 12 by asserting the defenses of non-compliance with the 
notice and filing requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and statute of 
limitation. See R., pp. 42, 46, 51, 58. 
Accordingly, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the trial court correctly 
ruled that Plaintiffs notices of claim were deemed delivered upon June 6, 1996 pursuant 
to § 63-37-1 of the Utah Code. The trial court thereafter correctly ruled that based upon 
the date of June 6, 1996 Plaintiffs Complaint filed on September 5, 1997 was untimely 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and is barred. This Court should therefore 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Pleasant Grove City, Lehi City, Provo City, and Utah County have shown that 
Plaintiff was at least one day late in filing his lawsuit under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The consequence is that the action is barred and the Fourth Judicial 
-18-
District Court ruled correctly in granting summary judgment for the Defendants. The 
judgment of the Fourth District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2000. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
GREGORY^fSftNDERS 
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City 
DALE J. LAMBERT 
REBECCA L.HILL 
Attorneys for Lehi City 
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
(fr^tFU* 
GARYL.GREGERSON 
DAVID C. DDXON 
Attorneys for Provo City 
STIRBA& HATHA 
MAY 
Attorneys for Utah County ShepuTs/)ffice 
-19-
ADDENDUM 
A. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint with Prejudice 
B. Ruling Dated March 17,1999 
C. Order Denying Motion for new Trial 
D. Title 63, Chapter 30, Sections 11,13, 14, and 15 
E. §63-37-1 
F. Pleasant Grove City Timeline 
G. Plaintiffs U.S. Postal Service Customer Receipt Forms 
-20-
ADDENDUM "A" 
A. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint With Prejudice 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
LINETTE B. HUTTON (Bar No.6408) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Defendants Utah County 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-8300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KEN RAY HARWARD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, PLEASANT GROVE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, LEHI CITY, 
LEHI POLICE DEPARTMENT, PROVO 
CITY, PROVO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
and JOHN DOES 1 THRU 10, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on February 2, 1999, pursuant to 
Defendants' Utah County, Utah County Sheriffs Office and Utah County Attorney's Office 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendants' Pleasant Grove City, Pleasant Grove Police Department, Lehi 
City, and Lehi Police Department's Motions for Summary Judgment, as well as Provo City's and 
Provo Police Department's Oral Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint ("collectively 
F1LE3 
Fourth Judicial Dtotf 
ot Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, ' 
le oi uian 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No.-9964000697 CV 
Judge Guy R. Bumingham 
hereinafter Defendants"). Following oral arguments from counsel, the Courts examination of the 
pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant Provo City's Oral Motion to Join in 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss is GRANTED; 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motions 
for Summary Judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint, as against the answering 
Defendants is dismissed with prejudice, finding as follows: 
1. The Utah County Attorneys are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for 
conduct which occurs within the scope of their official duties and, therefore, the Utah County 
Attorney's Office is not a properly named defendant in this matter; 
2. Claims against the Utah County Sheriffs Office, Pleasant Grove Police 
Department, Lehi Police Department and Provo Police Department are redundant claims as these 
law enfoi cement offices are not separate legal entities as defined by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and cannot be sued in an individual or independent capacity. These entities are not, 
therefore, properly named defendants in this matter; 
3. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred for failure to timely file pursuant to the relevant 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically §§ 63-30-11, 63-30-13 and 63-
30-15; and 
2 
4. Utah Code Ann." § 63-37-1 is applicable to this case in determining the date of 
service of the Plaintiffs Notice of Claim. 
Dated this 11 day of February, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jj) day of February, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE to the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1490 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Gary L. Gregerson 
David C. Dixon 
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Attorneys for Provo City 
P. O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(#U.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile (No. ) 
ffU.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile (No.. ) 
Dale J. Lambert 
Rebecca L. Hill 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Lehi City 
175 South West Temple #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(-^U.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile (No. ) 
Gregory J. Sanders 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Pleasant Grove City 
10 Exchange Place, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
OU.S. Mail, Postage Pre-Paid 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Mail 





B. Ruling dated March 17,1999 
^ ^ ^ ^ State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
^ -
i
^ l — ^ i _ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEN RAY HARWARD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY, UTAH COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, PLEASANT GROVE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT; LEHI CITY, LEHI 
POLICE DEPARTMENT; PROVO CITY, 
PROVO POLICE DEPARTMENT and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 10 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 970400697 
DATE: March 17, 1999 
JUDGE: GUY R. BURNTNGHAM 
This matter came before the Court under Rule 4-501 on Plaintiffs Motion for New 
Trial. The court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being 
advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. On or about February 17, 1999, Plaintiff submitted Motion for New Trial and 
supporting Memorandum, claiming that the Court had erred in its Order dated February 17, 1999, 
by incorrectly applying the 1998 amended version of Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-11 in 
determining that Plaintiffs action had been untimely filed. 
2. On or about February 24, 1999, Defendants Lehi City and Lehi Police Department 
filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, arguing that the 
inadvertent error in referring to the 1998 version of Section 63-30-11 does not change the 
correctness of the Court's primary ruling granting the Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions 
based upon untimely filing of suit. 
3. On or about March 1, 1999, Defendants Utah County, Utah County Sheriffs 
Office and Utah County Attorney's Office filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial, adopting Defendants Lehi City and Lehi Police Department's arguments. 
4. On or about March 1, 1999, Defendant Pleasant Grove City filed its Memorandum 
Opposing Motion for New Trial, also arguing that the filing of the lawsuit was late, even under 
the earlier version of Utah Code "Annotated Section 63-30-11. 
5. The Court finds that the date of filing Plaintiffs Notices of Claim is June 6, 1996, 
per Section 63-37-1. Plaintiff had one year from the claim denial date to file suit. September 4, 
1996, is deemed the claim denial date, because it is 90 days after the date of filing the Notices of 
Claim. Therefore, the last date for Plaintiff to timely file was September 3, 1997. The Plaintiffs 
suit against Defendants, filed on September 5, 1997, is time barred as failing to comply with 
Section 63-30-15 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. That ruling upon timeliness is in no 
way affected by the different versions of Section 63-30-11 of same act. Furthermore, Section 63-
30-11, under either the 1998 or previous version, requires that the Notice of Claim should be filed 
within one year after the claim arises. 
6. Furthermore, the Court wishes to point out that any inadvertence by the Court in 
referring the 1998 version of Section 63-10-11(3) was caused by Plaintiff who directed the Court 
to the 1998 version of Section 63-10-11(3) by using its exact provisions to argue his position on 
page 3 of Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Utah County's Motion to 
Dismiss filed October 19, 1998. It now seems disingenuous of Plaintiff to use the later version of 
the statue to support his position, to refer the Court to that version, and then ask the Court to set 
its Ruling aside on the basis of using the wrong version of the statute when it made its Ruling. 











8. Counsel for Defendant Pleasant Grove City is requested to prepare an Order 
consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit to other Defendants as well as opposing 
counsel for approval as to form before submission to the Court for signature. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, March 17, 1999. 
R.tfu 
Fourth District C 
cc: Peter Stirba 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Gary L. Gregerson 
Dale J. Lambert 




C. Order Denying Motion for New Trial 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CA8M* i s ^ i S ! ? * 
GREGORY J. SANDERS - 2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Pleasant Grove City 
and Pleasant Grove Police Department 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-3773 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




UTAH COUNTY, UTAH COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, PLEASANT GROVE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, LEHI CITY, 
LEHI POLICE DEPARTMENT, PROVO 
CITY, PROVO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 





Case No. 970400697 CV 
Judge Guy R. Burningham / 
The court having considered the plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and having further 
considered the responses thereto by Lehi City, Lehi Police Department, Utah County, Utah 
County Sheriffs Office, Utah County Attorney's Office, and Pleasant Grove City, and good 
cause appearing, hereby denies the motion. 
The basis of this denial is explained more fully in a Ruling issued by the court dated 
March 17,1999, and incorporated herein by reference. 
DATED this 2J_ day of April, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this>Pr day ofJkfefmty, 1999, to the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1218 
Gary L. Gregerson 
David C. Dixon 
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, UT 84603 
Dale J. Lambert 
Rebecca L. Hill 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Peter Stirba 
Linette B. Hutton 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 




D. Title 63, Chapter 30, Sections 11,13,14, and 15 
63-30-1L Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee s duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining 
an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
13) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person s agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
when the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is 
against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of 
Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public 
board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant 
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the appli-
cable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice, 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision according to 
the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or ifs 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 




63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date — When 
mailing date deemed filing date. 
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment 
required or authorized to be filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any 
political subdivision thereof, which is: 
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed 
or made and received by the state or political subdivisions on the dare 
shown by the post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or 
other appropriate wrapper containing it. 
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivisions where 
received and the cancellation mark is illegible, erroneous, or omitted, shall 
be deemed filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the 
sender establishes by competent evidence that the report, claim, tax 
return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the 
United States mail on or before the date for filing or paving; and in cases 
of such nonreceipt of any such report, tax return, statement, or other 
document required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state or 
political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after written notifica-
tion is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its 
nonreceipt of such report, tax return, statement, or other document. 
ADDENDUM "F" 
F. Pleasant Grove City Timeline 
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TIMELINE OF HARWARD CLAIM 
• - 90 days -» 2 
June 6, 1996 
Claim mailed ! 
«- 365 days - • 
September 4, 1996 
Claim denial by non response 
•- Two days -» 
September 3, 1997 
Last day to file 3 
September 5, 1997 
Suit Filed 
Date of mailing is date of service under §63-37-1. 
June 7, 1996 - September 4, 1996 = 90 days. 
§63-30-15 requires action filed "within one year" after denial period has expired. 
ADDENDUM "G" 
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l a p 5 POST OFFICE TO ADDRESSEE EH3H<mSS21flUS 
ORIGIN (POSTAL USE ONLY) 
PO ZIP Code . v j ^ w y o -
Date l i i - - -
Mo » Dav* Year 
Time In fEH 
Weight 
. Jfra _ - j K S -
No Delivery 
f>rt4<>f £>«WYM' -> ) < y ^ VjRalWte Envelope** u**w* ^ 
U-#«U yd fcwevlUu ton 
Acceptance Clerk Initials 
>M l t i | l i l |« t9TTy4l l l i t>llj 1)1 
i A V ' 
Total Postage & Fees 
Hit> *> f ' '* ' l ' -*•* i i i *» i h i I, 
I It U \{«o^.w»»> » J » I / , , - « J V. :-» 
! H i h - j h j M , >J)t, t w \ i i» tit i i / ' • • * ' ' j h b» t i l ' i It) 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
w. ,b ^ S E R y , C E ,9^ A R A N T E E A N D 
. I I IM' INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMITS 
METHOD OF PAYMENT! 
\{i\nui »hn» Otuiig to rrwntt&m & of qu onifat t* *> i'l^.OTQ&OTBtea^^ 
Federal A©encyAcct No. or hoOv> \ * * * t t i t l ) A l l J - M <*'*-, ^ tfki* r U <i*>tfl 9f f t 
[Postal Servfc* Acct No __ ^ i ^ ^ t e ^ 
(IAM4P THl/l OH « AWO < v 
T O l f U A M P W K T ) 
r 
4* / I I I I I* « », V*"< * 0 ^>J 4 t 
, ^ » ! - i ^ b >iu ^lnr»—o^| jcjufH iK' i i h i i ^ t n n n j i l J i 
FOR PICKUP OR TRACKINdflCALL 1-800-222-1811 "S 
Label 11 B August 1995 
EXPRESS 
POST OFFICE TO ADDRESSEE EH3MT4SSE3SUS MAIL - ^ . . , 
j jgjag^jj^nO ytliLn.) lit.1,) _ - , : - , j v I •'•.' I.'-'J I,..-..,-;,! .:. ORIGIN (POSTAL USE ONLY) 
ffo ZIP Code ••. «~-^r- • * 
Date In' V ' / *' <^i'}'\i:'if uaie in . >• * '/+••' ' 
' Mo& .* Day Year 
No Delivery 
•Oate-tir" bilMrfcyV-"?'-1^^ <<4 Rat FMte Envelope W . ^ m . 
j^prft" yd ba?$yr(f*bJQO d\fins Aii;tJu^a'Wld^' 
t V . N»»t ' ' ' U Second.' ", 
Acceptance Clerk Initials 
M jAJtoiittfrraUfftfpflJ Ail 
Postage^ ,'Ji.' liii &-\t'Jb'^ 
Total Postage & Fees S 
!fiU[} ;JflJ t>j«if '.;.' Ji.l;.L/U I . ...%c«::Ml^ :>.!! • -I !• ,.;.* if . ( .": , . J !.,-.. ?i -.-.,... 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ,, 
lft ..., SERVICE GUARANTEE AND 








J UtV.i, ...i * l ; : , , I t . J . t , . 1 , , 
CUSTOMER USE ONLY 
METHOD OF PAYMENT: 
' MaiCorporisAoct. No. V • •-.' •' • • .• "' • 
FedsrsiAi^ n^ -AtefjoitenoOiyi *Ai fil bd-miont utvtoo ekt)>nQ^&£>^ <MJ 
W O M I . W M * * ^ w o *#$iy^wm<tiJim"- l / f l <M •<>»?>• %«w»i«•«<{.H« »,* 
I ? ' / i"»J i i . • ' • . . . » • 
.•. '!;«»«1 *-'*/»."/ • 
.
 # — . . 
FOR PICKUP OR TRACKING CALL 1-800-222-1811 ^= 
Label 11-B August 1995 
EXPRESS 
MAIL POST OFFICE TO ADDRESSEE EH3M^M5SE7DUS 
ORIGIN (POSTAL USE ONLY) 
PO ZIP Coda .. «^f ^£?*$i 
.rnuunj /i o^tO isitofri 
Data! 
, ' • • ( . / - ^ " 6 : 
Mo. V Day^ Year 
m / Next '. ' L J Second , 
l l V L . t i , i i , . .^<M. . i .V 
["*"] .12NOOO Q r 3 P M 
i imo in . „ . . ••••; 
W e i g h t 
N o Delivery 
I n t T Alpha Count ry C o d e , ' " R » 0 2 
A c c e p t a n c e Clerk Initials Tota l Postage & Fees ^ 
•i .asiinbiv) taw pltet^ fw 
l> i1 t > * , ; ( i i ic ' l / i i
 v^»v' '<»*->v ll-^i/ I c't. v t .... «'^ i i . ' . " I't..j» 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
iy;„ .SERVICE GUARANTEE AND 
.nwvL INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMITS 
^ ,'/. « .» i - ' i l l i JL» | . ' . . i !.•-«• i ) ( | i l J l v V 
* . i>MJb I t * * • r ••-..«? i l . 
CUSTOMER USE ONLY 
METHOD OF PAYMENT; 
Expreg^MaMCorporateAoct No. , ' • ' . • • '; : "'" • • • • • - ' ' • 
iii^'A^Y&V^q^^ptlt^ t^ iiMoriVof«20:'i efdctios&at erf) Federal 
Poetal Service Acct. No. 
fori- zlyllnrnabrti'iSl'tlo- trwrttafim 6 a££j§2*JMl 01$ £ic^aa v> y 
Sy3C^" ( " ^ - ^ / ^ • < ? ^ <Dl^ KSC3te-*s.V5^ 9^ -^ «»f*>*>"«»\}ri\i\ nail.-
iwoluuu to 'Jtfcti uti{ U> i^ \»»* 
MAM^JUtj r m r v i «»->;*,> ro. 
.;>«<,!•» \,Uj/riM CLQOAS Try** "Cfo/^-^VSS / OA7 
U w U i i ^ i ' A ^ • • - • • i •'•« . . . » : ^ . . i i l h ».. ».{• •«*». ' . . . : . . : . - . .
 t n : . . t . : I * ••' 
MF* POST OFFICE TO ADDRESSEE EH3M<mSS337US 
ORIGIN (POSTAL USE ONLY) 
PO ZIP Code •_ v . ' ^ * ^ . ^ 
•; rnfcij» & fifty Wfetti ;| 
Date in1' ^ K ^ X ^ 
o.t.*->Pa/ Yeaf x 




Dotetof Dellvery'ly** .•tt*£Y\VJ 
pi boa ^rriitiii^inaiisi 
LJuf N»xt : L J Second „ 
Acceptance Clerk Initials 
Q » ^ . i i w W 1 ^ r ^ 3 f t M lM»M UirioMttfnetol e>rttb' 
Flat Rate Envelope i'1 v*V'-?.»*• 
p-ddj yxl bdievlk»t) Jon J 
Posta l" 4 ~^ ^^« ^ ^ 
Total Postage & Fees ^ 
a .U.tJtififci lit,WO<l^itlC 
I Jl 11 V - ' V l l ^ h i i u . i . t: /iit»|»t»l r.\ u;.-v ^ • • , ' 1 ' iV»« »*'• i<V »• / .. „. -/.. • 
IJW; l..-..;.,'.!•> •,. : . . , - t :n*: ! ; , i ' • :... •il.u'i c.'i.ii,. • >. j :**!• .i .. .I»J..-.«I i .." J "..' 
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
^
 u SERVICE GUARANTEE AND , . A ( 
.NoM, INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMITS^ w,s I 
CUSTOMER USE ONLY 
M E T H O D O f PAYMENT: 








Federal ) i & s f » W & ^ & ^ ^ © i d ? . n 0 e f c » 1 !#(*! 
Postal Service Acct. No. • . u - \.'.-..-' • - • • ' . » - = - . • 
ion ai v ' f fo^ 
^ 
I I A M I Q Tr>M rwi AMMO n>„ 
-«c»V|.';|Jt'ti »w l.'f.^i.?i
 4 « . i i i . . o - t 0 > vy«h t ' t i i . t/i*.'^' ,»y»ii»i»lt,»«t V-J-'iv*' • i «....:• -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 6th day of March, 2000, to the 
following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1218 
